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FEA TURE AR TICLE
Guarding Against The High Risk of High
Deductible Health Plans: A Proposal for
Regulatory Protections
By Michele Melden*
I. Introduction
Under the rubric of "consumer-driven health care," insurers,
employers, and policy-makers are experimenting with new types of
health insurance products, namely "high deductible health plans"
("HDHPs"). HDHPs allow consumers to purchase health insurance
with deductibles that might range from $1000-$5000 for individuals
and $2,500-$10,000 for families,' but which can reach even higher
amounts if not coupled with federal tax incentives. A deductible is
the amount that the insured individual must pay for medical costs
before the insurance company is required to pay for the costs of
health care.2 While federal tax law provides tax exemptions to
promote such plans by allowing consumers to couple them with
health savings accounts ("HSAs"), their existence does not depend on
the federal tax law nor on consumers' choice to fund the HSAs. 3
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26 U.S.C.A. § 223(c)(2)(A) (West 2005).
2 There are exceptions where the insurance companies will provide "first-
dollar coverage" for preventive care which will be discussed below, infra Section
II. Id. § 223(c)(2)(C).
3 In fact, ninety percent of consumers electing HDHPs who have the option of
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Rather, the growing trend in the insurance market to offer HDHPs
reflects a reality that is less about consumer choice and more about
consumer risk. HDHPs represent yet one more market reaction to
run-away health care costs and can best be described as the "hot
potato" approach to health care spending: pass along the risks of the
high costs associated with constantly rising health care spending
increases to consumers without addressing the underlying causes of
health care inflation.5
As these products appear, it is critical that we understand that
as much as the rhetoric focuses on expanding consumer choices, the
appearance of HDHPs on the market actually narrows and obscures
not only consumer choices but also the ability to pursue sound policy
in this area. Moreover, HDHPs are creating risks in a regulatory
vacuum. This article sets out a two-fold framework for addressing the
rhetoric versus the reality of consumer choice in this area. First, after
describing the types of products and the experience to date, this
article will address three fundamental myths that are promoted by the
proponents of such plans: 1) the myth of discretionary health care
spending; 2) the myth of discretionary income for health care
spending; and 3) the myth of consumer power to negotiate over and
make an impact on the costs of health care. In fact, this article will
funding an HSA have failed to do so. Paul Fronstin & Sara Collins, Early
Experience With High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Findings
from the EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumers in Health Care Survey, EBRI
ISSUE BRIEF No. 288 at 5 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI IB 12-2005.pdf.
4 See Wendy Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?, 69
BROOK. L. REv. 485, 541 (Winter 2004) (stating that "[c]onsumer-choice plans
shift responsibility for saving the system money from employers and insurers onto
consumers ...." See also id. at 507 (referring to Alain Enthoven's dismissal of
"consumer-choice" plans as a euphemism for "ordinary health insurance with a
high deductible") (citing Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance
is Failing: Now What?, HEALTH AFFAIRS-Web Exclusive at W3-239, May 28,
2003, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.237vl .pdf); Karen
Davis et. al, How High is Too High? Implications of High Deductible Health
Plans, The Commonwealth Fund Pub. No. 816 at 16 (stating that [t]he major effect
of a high deductible is likely to be a one-time shift in spending from premiums to
patient out-of-pocket outlays. Premiums to employers and workers would be
reduced by 10 to 15 percent... but most of that reduction would be a reduction in
covered medical outlays and a shift to out-of-pocket expenses for which patients
would be responsible").
5 See generally John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the
Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531 (2005) for a discussion of the
market-based reforms that have substituted for systemic policy yet have failed to
constrain costs or stem the rise in the uninsured.
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discuss a fourth myth that is not so much promoted by HDHP
proponents as presumed: consumer choice over the selection of
health insurance products and over how their collective risks are
"pooled." Confronting these myths is critical to understanding why
consumers require protection. If HDHPs are allowed to be marketed
freely without addressing the myriad risks they pose to consumers,
consumers will become increasingly "under-insured," meaning that
despite having insurance, they will be faced with health care costs
they cannot afford; and increasingly uninsurable, meaning that as
consumers develop health care problems, the only products left to
cover them will themselves be unaffordable. Therefore, the second
part of this article will propose model regulatory solutions to protect
consumers from the risks actually posed by these plans.
II. Background
The term "HDHPs" will be used broadly to refer to any plans
that offer "high deductibles" which, for the purpose of this article,
will include any amount higher than $1000. 6 They have emerged in
part as a result of federal tax exemptions for HSAs but in reality, can
be and are marketed separate and apart from such HSAs.
Nevertheless, this article will first describe the basic structure under
federal law. In 2003, Congress adopted the Medicare Modernization
Act which added section 223 to the Internal Revenue Code 7 in order
to promote the marketing of HDHPs by offering tax benefits for
contributions and earnings on Health Savings Accounts.8 The basic
structure is that consumers may establish HSAs with pre-tax income
and can use savings in the HSAs to meet qualified health care
6 While the federal law provides minimum and maximum amounts, there are
no consistent definitions under state law.
' 26 U.S.C.A § 223 (West 2005). These built on the experience of prior
"Archer" medical savings accounts which were limited in scope and have been
phased out. See Amy Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society
Health Care Policy, 80 TULANE L. REv., at footnote 11 (forthcoming 2006).
8 26 U.S.C.A §§ 233(e)-(f) (West 2005). Timothy Jost and Mark Hall have
noted that this legislation is one of the major federal health policy initiatives of our
time, and as such, is a unique exercise of "federalism" in the health care arena: The
law neither compels states to require insurers to offer these products nor does it
prohibit states from blocking such products; rather, "[iut simply makes it clear that
states that prohibit such policies will deprive their residents of access to a generous
federal tax subsidy." Timothy Jost & Mark Hall, The Role of State Regulation in
Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED 395, 400 (2005).
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expenses without paying a tax on the funds spent.9 However, HSAs
only can be offered if the employee has elected to use the funds in
conjunction with an HDHP that meets the federal legal requirements
and that is the only type of health insurance being used by the
consumer.' 0 Specifically, the minimum and maximum deductible
amounts under the federal law are: $1000-$5000 for individuals and
$2500-410,000 for families." These deductibles are amounts that
consumers will pay toward their health care that is in addition to the
amounts charged for the premiums, and once insurance kicks in,
additional to the amounts charged for "cost-sharing" in the form of
either co-payments or percentages of charges.
There are a couple exceptions to the basic structure. First
insurance companies may exclude certain preventive care expenses'I
from the deductible which means that the insurance company actually
will provide coverage for such amounts even if the deductible is not
met (referred to as "first dollar coverage"). First dollar coverage for
preventive care, however, is not mandatory; i.e., it is at the plan's
discretion whether to exempt preventive care from the deductible
amounts.13 In fact, IRS interpretation of federal law states that there
will be no deference to state law that requires insurance companies to
9 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 233(e)-(f) (West 2005). Employees who are offered HDHPs
at work are eligible to have employers also contribute amounts to the HSAs. Id. §
223(a) (stating that contributions may come from others on "behalf' of the
taxpayer). See also Internal Revenue Service, Health Savings Accounts, INTERNAL
REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-2 at Q-I1, Jan. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-02_IRB/arO9.html.
'0 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(c)(1) (West 2005). There are exceptions for insurance
for accidents, disability, dental care, vision care, and long-term care. Id. §
223(c)(1)(B).
" Id. § 223(c)(2).
12 Id. § 223(c)(2)(C). Preventive care is defined as including but not being
limited to: periodic health evaluations, routine prenatal and well-child care, child
and adult immunizations, tobacco cessation programs, obesity weight-loss
programs, and a variety of screening services for cancer, heart and vascular
diseases, infectious diseases, mental health conditions and substance abuse,
metabolic, nutritional and endocrine conditions, musculoskeletal disorders, ob/gyn
conditions, pediatric conditions, and vision and hearing disorders. Internal
Revenue Service, Health Savings Accounts-Preventative Care, INTERNAL
REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-15 at 2-3, April 12, 2004, available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-15_IRB/arlO.html. However, preventive care does not
include any service or benefit intended to treat an existing illness, injury or
condition. Id.
13 INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-15, supra note 12, at 1.
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provide first dollar coverage for certain types of care that are broader
than the narrow federal definition of preventive care.14
Second, health insurance plans can limit what counts toward
the deductible; specifically, health insurance plans that provide
coverage only if "network" providers are used can choose not to
count amounts actually expended on health care to out-of-network
providers toward the deductible. 15 Moreover, there is a lack of clarity
in the federal law or IRS interpretations on the issue of the insured's
financial exposure when using network providers: first, there is no
requirement that the favorable rates that insurers negotiate with
network providers are the rates that will be charged the insured; and
second, there is no requirement that if the insured is charged higher
rates, the higher charges will definitely count toward the deductible.
For example, while this Author is not enrolled in an HDHP, I recently
received an Explanation of Benefits form concerning a one-day
hospitalization for my son who had broken his elbow. The rate
charged was close to $11,000 but the rate negotiated with my insurer
was $1,100. Let's assume that I had been enrolled in an HDHP with a
$10,000 deductible. It is not clear whether: 1) I would have had to
pay up to $10,000 to cover the charge or whether my exposure would
be limited to the amount negotiated with the insurer; and 2) whether,
even if I spent up to the $10,000, whether the amount that actually
counted toward the deductible would be the actual amount I spent
rather than the negotiated amount of $1,100.
The scenario described above raises a further problem
inherent in the coupling of the HDHPs with the HSAs. Namely, there
is no legal structure for requiring coordination or consumer
information about which expenses that can be used from the HSAs
actually count toward the deductibles.' 6 The federal law requires only
14 Id. at 2. Note that federal guidelines provided a grace period which now has
expired. See Internal Revenue Service, Health Savings Accounts-Transition
Relief for State Mandates, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-27 at 1, July 6,
2004, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-27_IRB/arl3.html. At the same
time, states still have the power to require plans marketing HDHPs to exclude
preventive care from the deductibles as long as it fits within the narrow federal
definition.
'" 26 U.S.C.A § 223(b)(2)(B) (West 2005); INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN
2004-2, supra note 9, at A-4. In an article by Hall and Havighurst, the authors
applaud the idea of extending managed care cost-controls to HDHPs but
acknowledge that it is not required. See Mark Hall & Clark Havighurst, Reviving
Managed Care With Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1490, 1490
(2005).
16 This is true for any out-of-pocket expenses, whether or not they come from
2006] 407
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that HSAs be administered by either banks, insurance companies or
other qualified trustees 17 and that, in fact, not even the administrators
are responsible for determining what actually counts for the federal
tax exemption since this is actually a tax benefit for which the
taxpayer is responsible. 18 Therefore, where health insurance plans
maintain no responsibility for the HSAs, consumers must be
separately informed by the insurance plans whether expenses
incurred actually meet the deductible amounts. Notably, as with any
deductibles, the incentives clearly are directed against first dollar
coverage by the insurers.
Apart from the federal law, insurance companies have been
launching high deductible health insurance products to consumers,
including both employed consumers and individual consumers. 19 For
example, Blue Cross of California has undertaken a very slick youth-
oriented campaign toward individual consumers (who are seeking a
health insurance option outside the work-place) which includes web-
based information and applications called "Tonik.' ' 20 According to its
web advertisements, it is described as follows: "Health coverage for
your body, eyes, teeth. You know, the important stuff.' ' 21 However,
under the section entitled "Compare Plans," the following description
an HSA. See Hall & Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1497-98 (explaining that there
are a variety of administrative possibilities for informing consumers about which
expenses count, including a retrospective review). Note that it is typical that
individuals without insurance pay higher rates for care because they don't get the
advantages of negotiated rates by insurers who can guarantee a certain volume of
business. See Elizabeth Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Film: The
Dissolving Critique, 37 J. HEALTH L. 267, 282 (2004).
17 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(B) (West 2005). In fact, banks and insurance
companies are showing significant interest in entering the market. See Eric Dash,
Savings Accounts for Health Costs Attract Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at
Al.
18 INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-2, supra note 9, at A-29 (stating that
"HSA trustees or custodians are not required to determine whether HSA
distributions are used for qualified medical expenses. Individuals who establish
HSAs make that determination and should maintain records of their medical
expenses sufficient to show that the distributions have been made exclusively for
qualified medical expenses .... ).
19 See Daniel Costello, A Mini Price, a Mini Policy, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2005,
at F6. See also Kathy Robertson, Kaiser plans chase dwindling memberships: New
high deductible plans slash premiums, SACR. BUS. J., May 12, 2004.
20 Tonik Health Insurance - Blue Cross of California,
http://www.tonikhealth.com/ca (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
21 Id.
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was used: "Here it is. Health insurance, straight up. Three plans.
Same all-around coverage: Preventive, Emergency, Rx, eyes, teeth
(no maternity)" (emphasis added).22 The deductibles range from
$1500-$5000, two of the plans limit the consumer to 4 doctor's visits
per year, and the premiums range from $64-$80 per month.23 This is
clearly being marketed to the young, healthy, and male market
without chronic or intense care needs that they know about.24 If
insurers seek to launch HDHPs without HSAs, there is no federal law
that puts a cap on the deductible amounts or in any other way, places
limits on the structure of the HDHPs. In fact, as these insurance
products illustrate, this trend is coupled with another disturbing trend:
not only will the cost-sharing go up but the insurance industry is
marketing "diluted" insurance products that fail to cover
comprehensive health care needs.
25
There is a growing national interest by employers and insurers
26to promote HDHPs. According to a national survey of employed
individuals, while only ten percent of the respondents had elected an
HDHP,27 enrollment is expected to grow substantially in 2006.28
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 For example, can a person diagnosed with cancer limit himself to four
doctor's visits?
25 Note the exclusion above of maternity care coverage and the limitations on
doctors' visits and hospital care.
26 It also is a cornerstone of the current Republican agenda on health care as
enunciated in President Bush's most recent "State of the Union" address. See
Robert Pear, Health Care, Vexing to Clinton, Is Now at Top of Bush 's Agenda,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 11 (stating that "Mr. Bush has a fundamentally
different philosophy [from Mr. Clinton who favored a larger role for government],
built on the idea that placing more responsibility in the hands of individuals will
create market pressures to hold down costs"). President Bush has used his State of
the Union address in prior years also to discuss high deductible policies. Gail
Shearer, Commentary - Defined Contribution Health Plans: Attracting the Healthy
and Well-Off, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 1159, 1159 (2004).
27 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 21.
28 See id. at 4 (citing a survey by Mercer Human Resources Consulting which
found that seventy-three percent of large employers were very or somewhat likely
to offer them in 2006). In California, eighteen percent of employees were offered
HDHPs in 2004 and the number is expected to increase to thirty-three percent by
2006. RAND, 'Consumer Directed' Health Plans: Implications for Health Care
Quality and Cost, California Health Care Foundation Report at 6 (June 2005). At
least seventy-five insurers offer HDHPs nationwide and they span all markets:
fifty-eight to large employers, fifty-six to small employers, and forty-seven to
2006] 409
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Apart from the ideological discussions which will be discussed
below, there is a clear need to bring down the costs of health
insurance premiums. 29 Between 2000 and 2005, overall premiums for
health insurance increased a cumulative seventy-three percent, while
worker income increased only fifteen percent.30 Indeed, not only are
the premiums increasing, but also there is a trend to pass on more
costs to employees irrespective of whether HDHPs are even offered:
employees are paying a higher percentage toward the premiums, co-
payments are increasing, and of course, the deductibles are
increasing.3 1 The growing number of "uninsured" are among working
people who are offered health insurance but decline to take it, many
of whom do so because they cannot afford the costs of the
premiums. 32 Ironically, the federal legislation promoting HSAs
provides its greatest value to those in the highest tax brackets even
though they have the least amount of problems affording health
insurance.
individuals. Id. at 11-12. See also Savings Accounts for Health Costs Attract Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at A-i (citing a study that estimates that by 2010,
more than 15 million Americans, or about ten percent of the insured, will have an
HSA; the American Bankers Assn. is calling it a "gold rush:"). In fact, both banks
and insurers stand to profit by the development of HSAs. Id. at A-16 (stating that
"[b]anks make money each time a customer swipes his debit card at a doctors
office" and that "[the insurers and the banks] split the money earned for opening
and maintaining the accounts").
29 See generally Edward Larson & Marc Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on
Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE FoREST L.
REV. 1087, 1089-92 (2005).
30 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 4.
31 Id. See also Jon Gabel, Gary Claxton, et al., Health Benefits in 2003:
Premium Reach Thirteen-Year High as Employers Adopt New Forms of Cost
Sharing, 22:5 HEALTH AFFAIRS 117 (2003).
32 See Todd Gilmer & Richard Kronick, It's the Premiums Stupid: Projections
of the Uninsured Through 2013, HEALTH AFFAIRS-Web Exclusive at W5-143,
April 5, 2005 (asserting that the number of uninsured is projected to increase by
eleven million in the coming decade); Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance
and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2005 Current
Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 287 at 13 (Nov. 2005) (stating that
among the 15.2% of uninsured workers eligible for health benefits in 2002, nearly
two-thirds reported they declined it because of the cost); Daniel Costello, At What
Cost?, L.A. TIMES, April 4, 2005, at F-l, F-6 (stating that in order to keep health
coverage, more workers are cutting back on food, heat and other necessities and
still, "many of them eventually will lose the battle").
33 As with any tax benefit, the higher the individual's tax bracket, the greater
the value of the savings to the tax-payer. See Shearer, supra note 26, at 1159. See
410 [Vol. 18:4
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HDHPs should be seen as part of a greater trend to lower
premiums while promoting an insurance product that might
eventually be severed from employment altogether. 34 Interestingly,
among consumers choosing HDHPs, only ten percent are funding the
HSAs, 35 suggesting that the attractiveness may not so much be the tax
benefit but the lowered premium costs. By shifting more costs to the
consumer, the actual value of health insurance may actually be
diminishing to something akin to "catastrophic coverage," and could
prove an attractive alternative to those individuals for whom work-
place insurance is too expensive.
Unfortunately, this shift to consumers of increased risks for
the costs of medical care is occurring even when analysts are
discovering that medical debt is the leading cause of consumer
36bankruptcies. Alongside the 45 million Americans without health
also Monahan, supra note 7, at 54 n.52 (stating that "[t]he winners from the shift in
tax policy are those with high incomes who receive the greatest tax benefit from the
ability to save for medical expenses on a pre-tax basis") (citing Stephen Parente et
al., Evaluation of the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health Plan on Medical Care
Expenditures and Utilization, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 1091, 1189, 1198
(2004) (an examination of one large employer showed that the consumer driven
health plans attracted the highest percentage of employees from above the 75 t
h
percentile of income; GAO Report, Federal Employees Health Benefits Program:
First-Year Experience with High-Deductible Health Plans and Health Savings
Accounts, GAO-06-271 at 10 (Jan. 2006) (forty-three percent of federal employees
enrolled in HDHPs had annual incomes above $75,000 compared to twenty-three
percent for other plans); RAND, 'Consumer Directed' Health Plans: Implications
for Health Care Quality and Cost, California Health Care Foundation, June 2005 at
13 (noting that people with higher incomes will view the HSAs as investment
tools).
34 There are a variety of theories as to why insurance ultimately may be
severed from employment. Compare Mariner, supra note 4, at 511 with Enthoven,
supra note 4, at W3-237. Despite powerful federal tax incentives that apply to
employment-based health insurance (see Monahan, supra note 7, at 2), there is a
growing interest in promoting more affordable premiums on the individual market
with tax incentives of their own. See Pear, supra note 26, at 11 (discussing how
President Bush advocates for not "favoring" employment-based insurance with tax
breaks unavailable on the individual market or for small businesses wishing to
"band together").
35 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 5. See also id. at 13 (finding that
individuals with HDHPs reported a variety of reasons for not funding the HSAs but
that a full thirty percent reported they did not have the money); Claxton & Gabel, et
al., What High Deductible Plans Look Like: Findings from a National Survey of
Employers, 2005, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept. 14, 2005, at W5-435 (noting that one-
third of employers do not contribute to the HSAs).
36 See David Himmelstein et al., MarketWatch: Illness and Injury As
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insurance is emerging the growing class of "under-insured"
Americans: individuals who have purchased health insurance that is
ineffective in both protecting them from financial catastrophe and
from ensuring access to timely and necessary medical care.
37
According to a national survey evaluating the impact of HDHPs,
forty-two percent of consumers in HDHPs spent five percent or more
of their income on their health care as compared with twelve percent
of individuals in comprehensive health plans.38 In other words,
individuals in HDHPs were almost three and a half times more likely
to spend a substantial portion of their income on their health care,
although the plans are most heavily marketed to individuals who take
the risk that they will not have substantial health care expeises. 39 In
Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Feb. 2, 2005 (stating that about half
of personal bankruptcy filers cited medical debt as the cause of their bankruptcies).
This data has been disputed by a recent analysis funded by "America's Health
Insurance Plans." See David Dranove & Michael Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy:
Myth Versus Fact, HEALTH AFFAIRS-Web Abstract, Feb. 28, 2006,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.25.w74 and subsequent
response by the original authors, Himmelstein, et al., Discounting the Debtors Will
Not Make Medical Bankruptcy Disappear, HEALTH AFFAIRS-Web Abstract, Feb.
28, 2006, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.25.w84.
37 See John Leland, When Even Health Insurance is No Safeguard, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at A-l; Himmelstein et al., supra note 36; Melissa Jacoby,
The Debtor-Patient, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 453 (2004); Cathy Schoen et al., Insured
But Not Protected: How Many Adults Are Underinsured?, HEALTH AFFAIRS-Web
Exclusive, June 14, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/
abstract/hlthaff.w5.289 (noting that underinsured adults are almost as likely as the
uninsured to go without needed medical care and to incur medical debt; those with
greatest risk of being "underinsured" are those with lower incomes and those who
are sicker; "underinsured adults" are defined as having insurance that provides
inadequate financial protection as indicated by one of the following three
conditions: 1) annual out-of-pocket medical expenses amount to 10% or more of
income; 2) among low-income adults with incomes below 200% of the federal
poverty level, out-of-pocket medical expenses amount to 5% or more of income; or
3) health plan deductibles equal or exceed 5% of income).
38 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 13.
39 There is a contrast between individuals who choose HDHPs and are
employed and those who buy them on the individual market. Among individuals
who purchase them on the individual market, sixty percent report being in excellent
or very good health versus forty-seven percent who purchase HDHP at work. Id. at
6. Note, however, that fifty-one percent of individuals who purchase them at work
do not have a choice of another health plan offered to them. Id. at 9. See also
Laura Tollen et al., Risk Segmentation Related to the Offering of a Consumer-
Directed Health Plan: A Case Study of Humana, Inc., 39 HEALTH SERVS.
RESEARCH 1167, 1168 (2004) (concluding that offering a high deductible plan
alongside more traditional options caused risk segmentation within an employer
[Vol. 18:4
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fact, about one-third of individuals in HDHPs reported delaying or
avoiding care due to the costs.4 0 Ironically, it is the insured through
their health care premiums who pay the price for the uninsured or the
underinsured who cannot pay their bills: it has been estimated that
health insurance premiums in 2005 increased on average $922 due to
the cost of health care for the uninsured.4'
III. Deconstructing the Myths
The purported advantage of "consumer-directed health care,"
its principal feature being high deductibles, is that it addresses what is
called the "moral hazard" in health care spending.42 The term "moral
hazard" is used to refer to the fact that an individual is likely to incur
greater costs when someone else is financially responsible. This has
been the basis for criticizing the consumer's role in contributing to
rising health care costs in this country. As currently structured, the
demand and the cost of health care are driven largely by the health
care providers. Insurers pay the amounts charged while consumers'
costs are negligible. The insurers then pass along the increases
through the premiums charged which are paid mostly by the
employers, and the employers' costs are heavily subsidized by the
federal government through the tax code.4 3 No party who actually has
control over the costs has an incentive to minimize them while those
parties who could benefit from cost-containment have minimal
opportunities to exercise such control. Managed care was an
group).
40 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 15.
4' Kathleen Stoll et al., Paying a Premium: The Added Cost of Care for the
Uninsured (June 2005), at 2. See also The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured, The Uninsured: A Primer, Key Facts About Americans Without
Health Insurance (Jan. 2006) at 9 (estimating that the costs of uncompensated care
were about $41 billion in 2004).
42 See Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral
Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L. J. 12, 12 n.I (1999); Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral
Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44, 46; Andre Hampton, Markets,
Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abetting America's Flight from Health
Insurance, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 987 (2000).
43 See Larson & Dettmann, supra note 29, at 1091-92; Monahan, supra note 7,
at 7-8 and 20-22; Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health
Plan for the 1990s, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 5, 1989, at 29 (noting the open-ended
sources of financing of health care where costs are passed along to players without
an incentive to control cost resulting in a uniquely American paradox of excess
(high inflation and profits) and deprivation (growing numbers of uninsured)).
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experiment to place more risk and control on the providers
themselves.a For, a variety of reasons, and depending on your
perspective, the "experiment" of managed care as an effective
mechanism to control costs and offset the "moral hazard" is being
either abandoned or augmented by the movement toward consumer-
driven health care. a5
Consumer-driven health care, then, places a greater burden on
the consumer for taking on the expense of health care. However,
there are three myths perpetuated by its proponents which must be
addressed: 1) the myth of discretionary health care spending; 2) the
myth of discretionary income for health care spending; and 3) the
myth of consumer power to negotiate over and make an impact on the
costs of health care.
A. The Myth of Discretionary Health Care Spending
Consumer-driven health care proponents believe that
increasing consumer sensitivity to costs will help solve the problem
of rising health care costs. 46 According to proponents, "imposing
44 See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.383, 415-418 (1997). For a thoughtful critique of how
managed care failed to live up to its expectations, see John Jacobi, After Managed
Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 397, 399-400
(2003) (arguing that managed care had become a "classic black box." "We asked
managed care to work private sector magic on problems that had bedeviled
government. As with sausage making and the passage of laws, we were too often
happy not to be exposed to the precise mechanisms by which managed care
controlled utilization of health care.")
45 For a thoughtful summary, see John Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health
Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. OF MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 539-42 (2005), and
for different perspectives, see Carl Ameringer, Devolution and Distrust: Managed
Care and the Resurgence of Physician Power and Authority, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 187 (2002); Cara Lesser et al., The End of an Era: What Became of the
'Managed Care Revolution' in 2001?, 38 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 337 (Feb.
2003); Rick Mayes, Medicare and America's Healthcare System in Transition:
From the Death of Managed Care to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and
Beyond, 38 J. OF HEALTH L. 391 (2005); M. Gregg Bloche, One Step Ahead of the
Law: Market Pressure and the Evolution of Managed Care, in -THE PRIVATIZATION
OF HEALTH LAW REFORM (M. Gregg Bloche, ed., 2003). But see Hall &
Havighurst, supra note 15 (arguing against the idea that consumer driven health
care and managed care are antithetical but rather, advocating for a synergy whereby
cost-consciousness and discipline are exercised equally between consumers on the
demand side and managed care on the supply side).
46 See Jost & Hall, supra note 8, at 1 (summarizing the arguments in favor of
consumer driven health care). For a series of essays promoting the benefits of
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higher deductibles is the most effective way to turn patients into
consumers." 47 However, HDHPs represent a potential solution for
employers' and insurers' mutual interest in saving money and
shifting costs onto consumers so that.instead of denying care to
consumers, "consumers deny care to their future selves as patients. 48
The question, then, is whether consumers' decisions to deny care to
themselves results in cutting out those medical services that are truly
discretionary. The problem is that to answer that question, policy
makers would need to understand what is and is not discretionary.
Here are some areas where cutting out care might be
discretionary: switching to lower cost providers, switching to lower
cost drugs or technologies, utilizing preventive measures, delaying or
foregoing certain care that is not medically necessary, avoiding care
that is "experimental. ' '49 This may sound like a familiar list because
these are areas where managed care and even traditional insurance
historically have exercised control.5° While patients may have
challenged that control in particular instances, there is no reason to
believe that patients left to their own devices would do any better of a
job than the managed care plans have done.5'
In fact, there is good evidence that consumers will do a worse
job than managed care in responding to financial incentives to avoid
unnecessary care because they will delay or forego care without
making great distinctions and choices between medically necessary
and unnecessary care.52 The choices will impact most those with the
consumer-driven health care, see CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS (Regina Herzlinger
ed., 2004).
47 Jost & Hall, supra note 8, at 1 n.7.
48 Mariner, supra note 4, at 541.
49 See James Robinson, Health Savings Accounts - The Ownership Society in
Health Care, 353 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 1199, 1201 (2005).
50 Id.
51 Paul Feldstein et. al, Private Cost Containment: The Effects of Utilization
Review Programs on Health Care Use and Expenditures, 318 N. ENG. J. MED.
1310, 1313-14 (1988) (finding favorable results in the use of utilization review to
reduce hospital admissions, cut down inpatient days, and save total medical
expenditures). See also John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 311, 381 (1997) (stating that one critique of consumer driven health
care is that personal control of health expenditures is inconsistent with the structure
of cost containment through managed care, and citing studies that have looked at
the lack of control over costs once the deductible is exhausted).
52 For a detailed discussion of the problems with putting consumers in charge
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least amount of money to spend. s As a result, some critics have
referred to consumer financial incentives as a "blunt instrument."
54
According to a landmark study by the Rand Corporation," high
deductibles have "selective effects:" the most vulnerable patients are
put at greatest risk.56 Because patients cannot effectively distinguish
between care that is necessary and that which is "discretionary," the
Rand study found that there were adverse effects on health for lower-
income and high-risk individuals.
57
More recent studies have confirmed these results: Americans
with higher deductibles are significantly more likely than those with
lower deductibles to report difficulty obtaining needed care.
58
According to a 2003 survey by the Commonwealth Fund, thirty-eight
percent of individuals with deductibles of $1000 or more reported at
least one of four cost-related access problems: not filling a
prescription, not getting needed specialist care, skipping a
recommended test or follow-up exam, or having a medical problem
but not visiting a doctor or clinic.59 A more recent survey (October
of these decisions based on lack of skill and information, see Monahan, supra note
7, at 34-44. Note that there are some scholars who are promoting the idea of
combining HDHPs with managed care "to create synergies that should benefit
consumers and bring new cost-consciousness and discipline to the health care
marketplace." Hall & Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1490.
53 See Himmelstein et al., supra note 36; Elizabeth Warren, The Growing
Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 416-420 (2004)
(documenting the financial vulnerability caused by medical expenses that threatens
even the middle class).
54 Karen Davis, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will It Improve Health
System Performance?, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 1219, 1230 (2004).
55 See generally Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand
for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
251 (1987).
56 Arnold Relman, The Health of Nations: Medicine and the Free Market, THE
NEW REPUBLIC 23, March 7, 2005, at 27.
5' Davis, supra note 54, at 1221-22 (noting a number of additional studies
reviewing care for low-income children and adults with particularly disturbing
results of adverse health effects: significantly lower chances of receiving effective
services for acute conditions, receiving preventive care, and avoiding inappropriate
hospital admissions).
58 Davis et al., supra note 4, at 4.
59 Id. at 8. This is compared to twenty-one percent of individuals with no
deductible. See Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 15-17 (noting significant
negative impacts among enrollees in HDHPs with a correlation between enrollment
and skipping or not filling medications).
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2005) conducted by the Employee Benefits Research Institute and the
Commonwealth Fund similarly found that individuals with HDHPs
were significantly more likely to avoid, skip, or delay care (about
one-third) because of costs, with a more pronounced problem among
people with incomes below $50,000.60
Moreover, there is a total lack of reliable and understandable
information for consumers to use in making informed decisions about
whether to incur expenses or not.6 1 For example, there is little public
information even for providers to adopt "best practices" toward high
performance, nor is there good data to work from. 62 In addition, few
plans provide advice for patients who are under-using services.
63
Quality and cost information are almost non-existent.64
B. The Myth of Discretionary Income for Health Care Spending
As noted above, HDHPs negatively impact individuals with
annual incomes less than $50,000. 5 Despite this disproportionate
impact, no provisions have been made to reduce the negative effects
60 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 1.
61 Id. See also Davis, supra note 54, at 1228.
62 See Statement of Cheryl Damberg, Senior Policy Researcher, RAND
Corporation before California Department of Insurance, Sept. 20, 2005, at 9-11
(noting the absence of reliable and consistent quality and price data that is either
collected or available).
63 Davis, supra note 54, at 1227. See also Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at
19-21 (noting a clear deficit of information about providers, even where more than
fifty-percent of enrollees in HMOs attempted to access such information).
64 Davis, supra note 54, at 1228. See also RAND, supra note 28, at 17-18
(describing a number of quality indicators (e.g., Leapfrong, and JCAHO standards)
used by health plans to create tiers relating cost and quality and noting that they are
still too complex for either consumers or employers to utilize effectively, let alone
result in pressures toward cost-effectiveness); GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 21
(stating that "[e]nrollees [in HDHPs] need information to help them assess the cost
and quality trade-offs between different health care treatments and providers.
However, the extent to which [HDHPs] made such information available to
enrollees was varied and limited .... Most notably lacking was specific
information to assess the quality of health care provided by particular physicians
and the actual prices plans had negotiated with particular providers"); Damon
Darlin, You Think 401(k)'s Are Hard to Manage? Try Health Accounts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at B5 (noting the basic lack of consumer information to help
individuals obtain price and quality information necessary to make choices).
65 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 1.
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on this population. Most employers offering plans with greater cost-
sharing do not include reduced cost-sharing for lower-wage
workers.
66
An exhaustive study investigating consumer bankruptcies
found a substantial correlation with medical debt.67 One of the most
eye-opening aspects of this work was the finding that seventy-five
percent of those suffering with medical debts and declaring
bankruptcy had insurance. 6These people can be referred to as the
"under-insured," because although they have health insurance, they
still cannot afford their medical care. Individual examples have been
documented in the media. 69 In fact, only ten percent of employees
who have the option of setting aside funds in Health Savings
Accounts to save for their deductibles are actually putting money in
their accounts,7° suggesting that they may not have the discretionary
income to save. This is particularly problematic for lower-income
consumers because the most recent studies show that forty-two
percent of those with HDHPs spent more than five percent of their
income on out-of-pocket costs, as compared to seventeen percent of
those in comprehensive health plans.71 If they do not have the money
to spend, the driving force behind the consumer's exercise of
discretion will not be whether the care is necessary but whether the
consumer's income is sufficient to cover the bill.
C. The Myth of Consumer Power to Negotiate Over and Make
an Impact on the Costs of Health Care
It is estimated that only a small percentage of medical costs
are due to expenses driven by physician recommendations and that
66 Davis, supra note 54, at 1222; Pacific Business Group on Health, Benefit
Strategies to Promote Quality, Value and Access in High Deductible Health Plans,
PBGH Board of Directors Retreat 2005 Summary (suggesting that employers
consider "income-specific adjustments" on the high deductible option).
67 Himmelstein et al., supra note 36, at 63.
68 id.
69 Leland, supra note 37, at 4. See also Warren, supra note 53, at 407 and 417
(noting the increased vulnerability of working Americans, and even families with
both partners working, to medical debt).
70 Note that if they fund the savings accounts, those savings are theirs to keep,
meaning that not funding the savings accounts truly represents a lost opportunity to
save money, in contrast to the prior Health Reimbursement Arrangements where
money not spent was lost. See Larson & Dettman, supra note 29, at 1101-02.
7 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 1.
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managed care's effectiveness has been, in part, to control these
costs. Therefore, even if consumers did just as good a job as
managed care plans 73 in negotiating over costs and reversing doctors'
incentives to drive up health care spending, the impact would be
modest. In fact, the great majority of total health care costs (sixty-
nine percent) is attributable to only ten percent of the population,
those who are terminally and chronically ill.74 This population would
most quickly exhaust their deductibles and the incentives not to incur
the deductibles would be lost quickly upon them.
75
There is much to be skeptical about in the idea that consumers
will exercise some kind of bargaining power by "shopping around"
and negotiating price with a physician or any other provider.76
Indeed, there is a strong ideological divide between those who
believe that ordinary market concepts apply to health care and those
who do not.77 According to the October 2005 EBRI/Commonwealth
72 See Davis et al., supra note 4, at 15-16 (noting total expenditures below the
deductible account for only twenty-one percent of total health care spending). In
fact, major contributors to health care inflation arise from costs not driven by
physicians, such as prescription drugs and hospital care. See, e.g., Bradley Strunk
et. al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth Accelerates Again in 2001, HEALTH
AFFAIRS-Web Exclusive at W304 (2002), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.299vl; Stephen Heffler, et al., Health Spending Projections
for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFFAIRS-Web Exclusive, Feb. 7, 2003,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.54vl ?maxtoshow-&HITS = 10
&hits= 10&RESULTFORMAT=&authorl=Heffler&fulltext-Health+Spending+&a
ndorexactfulltext-and&searchid = 1 &FIRST1NDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT.
73 There are multiple explanations for the reasons why managed care itself
failed to achieve cost-savings but critics remain skeptical that consumer driven
health care can pick up the slack. See Jacobi, supra note 44, at 406 (stating that
"[c]onsumer-driven health plans have migrated far from the vision of managed care
as an expert organizer of medical care. They are instead a reaction to the failings of
managed care, and they hold little promise of advancing social goals of cost
control, increased access to coverage and improvements in quality").
74 Davis, supra note 54, at 1223.
75 id.
76 See generally Uwe Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos
Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 57 (2006) (raising sharp criticisms
of consumer-driven health care and its ability to function as a meaningful control
over health care costs, using the Byzantine structure of hospital charges as an
example where consumers could doubtfully exercise much influence).
77 For a highly developed critique of the market approach and policies aimed
at promoting consumer cost-sharing, see Rice, supra note 44, at 407. See also
Hampton, supra note 42, at 1005; Jacobi, supra note 45, at 533 (stating that
"[Consumer driven health plans are] likely to fail for two reasons. It will endanger
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Study, while consumers enrolled in HDHPs evidenced more "cost-
consciousness" by checking on prices and discussing treatment
options with their physicians, their efforts, sadly, did not drive down
the actual costs; instead, they simply chose to forego care.7 8 Even if a
consumer could negotiate price with a doctor over receiving a single
service, it is highly unlikely that this negotiation would exert any
meaningful effect on the costs of future services provided by that
particular doctor should the patient choose to form a doctor-patient
relationship, nor on more expensive treatment options, such as
diagnostics and hospital care over which that doctor would have
minimal control.79 In fact, some critics note that not only would
consumers lack control over negotiating price but the health care
system as a whole would lose the control necessary to institute
quality of care improvements which requires coordination and
integration among related treatments and providers, a stark contrast to
the idea of consumers shopping around, service by, service, amongst a
variety of competing and independent physicians.
the health and well-being of the chronically ill ... and it will fail (as did the
managed care 'revolution') to contain costs"); Relman, supra note 56, at 5;
Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44-
49, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050829fafact.
Compare with Hall & Havighurst, supra note 15, at 1493 (articulating an argument
for viewing consumer driven health care as "progressive, pro-consumer advance
over managed care" by giving patients "more control on the micro level of
spending on services ... .
78 Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3, at 20-21.
79 See Monahan, supra note 7, at 49.
80 Relman, supra note 56, at 27 (stating that "the Institute of Medicine's
recommendations about quality [could not] be achieved if doctors and hospitals
were expected to function as independent vendors do in ordinary markets, simply
responding to the demands of consumers. The essential task of coordination and
integration of services for each patient would be left to the patients themselves, and
the uniform adoption of modem information technology would be impossible. A
fully developed CDHC [consumer driven health care] market would be chaotic, to
say the least, and in such a system continuity of care would be virtually non-
existent"). See also Enthoven, supra note 4, at W3-237-249 (criticizing consumer
driven health care for bringing back the "old model" of free choice, fee for service
medicine that simply shifts costs while avoiding "serious competition based on
value for money" where cost-containment is achieved by altering the fundamental
way health care is organized and delivered); Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 43, at
31 (positing that the whole system never will realize efficiencies unless coverage is
universal because of the persistent problem of "cross-subsidizing" the uninsured).
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D. The Myth of Individual Consumer Choice and the Risk of
Losing Affordable Comprehensive Health Insurance
The fundamental question is whether consumers actually have
meaningful choices about their health insurance. There are two
fundamental constraints: can employers afford the premiums and can
consumers afford the premiums? 8 1 The majority of insured
Americans are offered insurance at work and when they are offered
health insurance, there is no guarantee that they are offered a choice
of plans. Because employers pay the greater proportion of the health
care premiums, the choices, in large part, are determined by what the
employer can afford.82 Therefore, there is an incentive for the
employers and the insurers to offer products with lower premiums.
83
HDHPs help answer that problem by lowering the premiums because
the employees take up a larger share of the cost through the
deductibles. 84 Similarly, employees will be attracted to the lower
premiums; indeed, some employees will have no choice but to select
plans with the lower premiums because plans with higher premiums
are increasingly unaffordable. As discussed above, there is a growing
class of "uninsured" Americans who are offered insurance at work
but decline the insurance because they cannot afford the premiums.
85
The financial pressure may lead them to opt for HDHPs which can
create great risks to health care consumers as individuals and as a
group.
On the individual level, the risks of being under-insured are
particularly acute for individuals with lower incomes and those with
greater health care needs. As discussed above, the result could be a
clear adverse effect on their health and on their financial status.
81 State and federal regulations also play an important role in determining the
extent to which insurers are required to accept applicants and the
comprehensiveness of the coverage they are required to provide. See infra Section
IV.
82 See Mariner, supra note 4, at 506 (stating that "[e]mployment-based plans
still give the employer the ultimate say in which choices are available," and that
"[t]here is some evidence that the majority of employers pay more attention to the
cost of premiums than to the quality of care or the operation of health plans").
83 See generally Gilmer & Kronick, supra note 32, at W5-149 (concluding that
projected premium increases will increase the number of uninsured Americans by
11 million in the next decade, from 45 million.in 2003 to 56 million in 2013).
84 See Gabel et al., supra note 3 1, at 117-26.
85 See Kaiser Commission, supra note 41, at 13 (noting that twenty percent of
uninsured workers had health benefits offered to them but declined to participate).
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However, there are further risks. As consumers feel financial
pressures to opt for HDHPs, the erosion of their health insurance will
lead them to forfeit key federal protections under "COBRA" and
"HIPAA." Specifically, under COBRA,86 consumers who change
jobs have the option of retaining their health insurance but at 102% of
the premium.8 This is typically expensive. A much less expensive
HDHP product marketed on the individual market is likely to be
more attractive even if it results in far greater financial risk and even
if it carries more limitations. 88 However, individuals moving to the
individual market may not fully understand what they are giving up.
Under HIPAA's "portability" protections, an individual cannot be
excluded due to pre-existing conditions from health insurance at a
new employer 89 as long as the existing insurance was as
comprehensive as that offered by the new employer.9" HIPAA
legislative history indicates that deductibles can be used to determine
the comparative "comprehensiveness" of a health insurance product.
91 Therefore, employers can circumvent the limitations on pre-
existing condition exclusions where there is a significant differential
in deductibles. By opting for more bare bones coverage and higher
deductibles, consumers are putting themselves at risk of being
uninsurable. Sadly, this is undermining key incremental reforms
made to improve access to health insurance by limiting insurers from
86 29 U.S.C.A § 1162 (West 1997).
87 Id. § 1162(3).
88 Similarly, "discount health plans" which are not even insurance products
and in most states, not even regulated by insurance agencies, may be attractive,
leaving the field open for perpetrating a number of fraudulent and misleading
schemes on unknowing consumers. See Gerard Britton, Discount Medical Plans
and the Consumer: Health Care in a Regulatory Blindspot, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L.
REV. 97, 108-11 (2004); Jost & Hall, supra note 8, at 401-02 (discussing the
potential confusion resulting from such an interplay).
89 Under HIPAA, an individual with prior "creditable coverage" cannot be
excluded for the amount of time that the employee was previously covered;
however, a new employer can provide insurance which excludes an individual
based on a pre-existing condition for up to 12 months if that individual does not
have "creditable coverage." 29 U.S.C.A § 1181 (a) (West 1996).
90 See id. § 118 l(c)(3)(B) (stating that employers can elect to extend periods
of exclusion where the level of benefits is not consistent between plans).
91 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-736, at 181-182 (1996) (stating that "the inclusion
versus exclusion of a category of benefits such as pharmaceuticals could be
considered a difference in classes of benefits. Similarly significant differentials in
deductibles could be considered differences in classes of benefits").
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excluding high risk individuals. 92
The impact of these increased risks goes beyond the
individual consumers. First, any increase in unfunded medical debt
will adversely affect health care providers because they will suffer
the financial strain of unpaid medical bills.93 Second, HDHPs pose a
pronounced problem of "risk segmentation:" this refers to the
phenomenon of younger, healthier individuals gravitating toward the
cheaper plans, leaving the older (which includes the middle-aged)
and chronically ill in the more comprehensive plans. The result is a
negative spiral (referred to as an "insurance death spiral")94 whereby
the comprehensive plans cannot offset the higher risks of the older
and sicker members with the lower risks of the younger members,
thereby raising the costs in the more comprehensive plans.95 Those
plans will become more and more expensive, resulting in higher
premiums and lower take-up rates, leaving more people either
without insurance or being financially pressured into selecting the
HDHPs with greater and perhaps unaffordable financial risk, again
with the potential for adverse health effects. The net result of these
multiple individual choices may be to drive comprehensive health
plans out of the market and increase the risks for everyone.
IV. The Regulatory Vacuum
Unfortunately, there is an absence of a coherent regulatory
response to the problems raised above: a) how to protect individual
92 For a thoughtful and detailed discussion on the significance of COBRA and
HIPAA protections in requiring a greater "pooling of risks" and preventing harmful
segmentation, see Jacobi, supra note 51, at 366-87. Jacobi notes the irony of these
reforms emerging at the time that medical savings accounts were being promoted,
explaining that the legislation emerged as a result of compromise between two
competing and conflicting visions on the role of the market and government to
address the "ends of health insurance." Id. at 384-85.
93 See Kaiser Commission, supra note 41, at 9 (noting that uncompensated
care to physicians is neither directly nor indirectly reimbursed by public dollars and
even where hospitals are compensated, the extent to which the Medicaid and
Medicare programs are cutting back on reimbursement will result in a diminished
willingness to care for the uninsured).
94 Mariner, supra note 4, at 511.
95 See Tollen et al., supra note 39, at 1168 (asserting that "[I]f such
segmentation occurs and plan sponsors do not adjust their contributions to
counteract it, premiums for comprehensive health insurance products could become
less affordable to the extent that those products primarily attract less-health
employees"). See also Jacobi, supra note 51, at 380.
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consumers from making bad choices about delaying or foregoing
medically necessary care; b) how to protect individual consumers
from the financial risks involved; and c) how to protect consumers
generally against undue "risk segmentation" and the potential market
forces which may lead to the dilution and ultimately, the elimination
of comprehensive health insurance as a choice.
Proponents of consumer-driven health care have argued that
market forces can help solve the public policy problem of inflationary
health care expenses. However, it is questionable whether ordinary
contract law can counter-balance the unequal bargaining power
insurers and employers exercise in determining consumer "choice.
97
The problem is that consumers exercise not only a negligible degree
of control over selecting their health insurance products, but also over
whether they even will be accepted or how the risks are pooled
(which can lead to how premiums are raised). "Market" control over
those aspects of the health insurance contract is exercised
predominantly by employers who actually have a conflict of interest
between them and the employees insofar as employers are interested
in limiting their contributions to the premiums and in shifting costs to
the employees.98
Because health insurance contracts between insurers and
insureds generally are standardized "adhesion" contracts, individual
consumers have very little power to negotiate the specific terms, a
problem which is exacerbated by the degree of control exercised b
employers in controlling the choices offered their employees.!
Indeed, because insurance contracts are fundamentally non-
negotiable, some scholars have noted that the goal of insurance
regulation is to "remedy[] unfairness in insurance contracts."' 100
Therefore, insurance law always has represented a unique
96 For a summary of the legislative history, see Larson & Dettman, supra note
29, at 1107-08. In this article, the authors note the irony arising because the fact
that the HSAs are tax-subsidized was never acknowledged as "distorting" the
market. Id. at 1108-09.
97 For an excellent analysis of the tensions raised by dually treating insured
individuals as consumers and patients, and skepticism about the role of contract law
in resolving such tensions, see Mariner, supra note 4.
98 See Kathy Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 Loy. U. CHIC. L. J. 547, 570
(2002).
99 See Mariner, supra note 4, at 522-23.
'oo See id. at 524 n. 112 (citing Corbin).
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intersection of contract and regulatory law. While contracts are used
to define the relationship between the insured and the insurer, state
and federal regulation have been necessary to provide essential
consumer protections in the areas of preventing insolvencies,
promoting actuarial soundness, implementing policies related to the
pooling of risks, and protecting consumers from being excluded.' 0'
Insurance regulation is fundamental to protect the manner in which
risks are spread over groups of individuals and it is impossible for
contracts between individual insurers to address the spreading of such
risks.
102
In addition, outside of specific state and federal regulatory
requirements, legal theories based on civil rights and anti-
discrimination claims aimed at requiring inclusion of specific
individuals or of specific services have provided only modest
protections. 10 3 Consumer protection, thus, depends on regulation to
address what in other markets might be considered market failures:
the unwieldy and potentially collusive power exercised by employers
and insurers to limit choices and exclude consumers from the
market. 10 4 Without such regulation, the insurance products are at risk
of being "diluted" over time. Specifically, as discussed above, the
market pressures to create affordable premiums have led to HDHPs
but they put consumers on an individual and general level at risk.
The regulation of health insurance itself has always occupied
a unique status of being relegated predominantly to state
regulation. 1  Federal law, however, has encroached in several ways.First, since the 1950s, Congress has provided generous federal tax
'0' See generally Len Nichols & Linda Blumberg, A Different Kind of 'New
Federalism'? The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 17
HEALTH AFFAIRS 3, 25 (May/June 1998).
102 This is true even though there are basic ideological divides about the role
of insurance in providing a "social" good versus just a market good. See generally
Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 287 (1993); Stone, supra note 42; Jacobi, supra note 51.
103 See generally Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral
Fairness in Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L. REv. 659 (2003); Elizabeth Pendo,
The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Exclusions as Discrimination, 11
CONN. INS. L.J. 293 (2004-2005); Jacobi, supra note 51.
104 For a discussion on the role of regulations to adjust risks to prevent the
type of market failure described above, see Jacobi, supra note 51, at 396-97.
105 It has been treated as a traditional state police power over health and safety
and the state preeminence was reinforced by federal law which left insurance
regulation to the states. Jost & Hall, supra note 8, at 397-98.
2006] 425
Loyola Consumer Law Review
incentives for employer-based health insurance which has resulted in
a federal subsidy but this has not significantly encroached on the state
role. 0 6 However, second, through ERISA, Congress and the courts
have laid the foundation for large employers who "self-insure" to
make themselves immune from any state attempts to regulate the
insurance being offered. 10 7 Now, through HSAs, Congress has
offered a tax incentive which consumers only can enjoy if they
choose HDHPs as their exclusive source of coverage. 1°8 This offers a
unique experiment in a third type of federalism over health care
insofar as states are not required to take any action to authorize
HDHPs but neither are they prevented from regulating nor even
prohibiting them. 0 9 In fact, the federal regulations only touch on a
few aspects of the structure of the HDHPs but otherwise leave a great
deal of flexibility for state regulation over the HDHPs themselves.
0
The areas for potential state regulatory action fall into two
categories: a) the extent of state authority over HDHPs which are
coupled with HSAs under the federal law; 11 and b) the role of state
authority over HDHPs that are not marketed in conjunction with the
federal tax incentives associated with HSAs. As noted above, state
authority over HDHPs offered by ERISA self-insured plans is
completely preempted.' 12 This paper will address generally areas for
regulatory guidance on both the state and federal levels.
106 Id. at 400.
107 Id. at 398-99. See also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208-209
(2004); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
108 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1)(A) (2005).
109 Jost & Hall, supra note 8, at 400.
110 Note, however, that there is a contrast over regulation of HSAs insofar as
they are administered by banks which are regulated exclusively by federal law. Id.
at 407-08.
... Id. at 401-03 (identifying a number of areas left open for state regulation
with the introduction of HDHPs coupled with HSAs). See also Jacobi, supra note
5, at 577-79.
112 Id. at 579 (pointing out that despite ERISA's preemption over self-insured
plans, there is still potential for state regulation of HSAs not administered by banks,
opening a possible "back-door" to ERISA preemption).
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V. Formulating Regulatory Protections
A. Protecting Individual Consumers from Making Bad Choices
About Delaying or Foregoing Medically Necessary Care
1. Clarify and Maximize the Definition of Preventive Care
The place to begin is to make sure that individuals, even if
concerned about spending money out-of-pocket, are not deterred
from obtaining preventive care. As explained above, while federal
law provides a "safe harbor" for HDHPs to exclude preventive care
from the deductible, the plans have discretion as to whether they will
actually provide for such an exclusion. In order to maximize the
benefit of the federal law, states should pass laws that requires
HDHPs to exclude all preventive care included under the federal
definition'3 so that it is not left to the discretion of the plans. This
protection should apply to all HDHPs, whether or not they are linked
to HSAs.
The federal definition, unfortunately, is limited because it
excludes the chronic care needs of individuals with on-going
conditions; for example, individuals with diabetes, hyper-tension, and
asthma may actually avoid unnecessary hospitalizations if their
conditions are controlled but doctors' visits and medications
necessary to control those conditions are not included. 14 Extending
the definition would be cost-effective and would benefit consumers
by helping them avoid unnecessary declines and adverse impacts on
their health." 15 Therefore, states should adopt a broader definition of
preventive care for HDHPs that are not offered in conjunction with
HSAs to include health care services necessary to control chronic
conditions.
In addition, "case management" is a service that can help
consumers, particularly those with chronic care needs, navigate
amongst a variety of health care providers and under ideal conditions,
"' 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(C) (2005); INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-15,
supra note 12, at 2-3.
114 For example, an inhaler for someone with asthma would not be included,
nor would regular visits to treat hypertension and blood sugar problems.
115 See Jacobi, supra note 45, at 576-77.
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promotes preventive and cost-effective care.1 16 State law could
include case management as a preventive service that is excluded
from the deductible amounts for HDHPs not offered in conjunction
with HSAs.
2. Provide Consumers Clear and Prompt Access to
Information So That They Understand What Constitutes
Preventive Care and If They Are Not Sure, a Prompt
Process to Answer Specific Questions
As discussed above, there are plentiful opportunities for
consumers to become confused about what expenses actually will
qualify for the deductions and which might be excluded because they
constitute preventive care. First, if they are in HMOs, the plans have
discretion not to allow any out-of-pocket costs incurred with respect
to out-of-network providers to count toward the deductibles." 
7
Second, even if such expenses might count toward the deductibles,
there are no applicable rules regarding whether a discounted rate used
by the plans for a similar service will create an upper limit on the
deductibles. Third, there are no legal requirements placing clear
duties on HDHPs with respect to informing consumers about which
expenses count. Most plans now provide explanation of benefit forms
which indicate what counts toward a deductible but these are always
retrospective. That means that consumers who are concerned about
whether to incur an expense but are not sure whether it will count
toward the deductible, or how much of it will count, have no legal
right to an answer to that question prior to incurring the cost.
To address these problems, there should be legislation that
requires plans to inform consumers about which expenses count
toward the deductible at three junctures: a) in the information
describing benefits; b) following any encounter with the health care
system; and c) upon a consumer's request prior to accessing services.
Most health insurance plans utilize some types of prospective review;
this would be a matter of extending the opportunities for consumer
116 See Arlene Luu & Brian Liang, Case Management: Lessons Learned from
Integrated Delivery to Promote Quality Care to the Elderly, 9 J. MED. & L. 257,
260-61 (2005). See also Davis, supra note 54, at 1 (noting that studies have found
over-utilization often is the result of provider decisions: about one-fifth of sicker
patients report receiving duplicate tests from different physicians, and medical
records and tests are not readily available to them - case management would be a
benefit to both the consumer and the insurer).
117 26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(B) (2005); INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETiN 2004-2,
supra note 9, at Q 11.
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education by providing consumers with a right to access such
prospective review procedures themselves.
Legislation also should require plans to give consumers
access to information and staff to help them differentiate among
"discretionary" and non-discretionary health care spending with an
emphasis on addressing: 1) not filling prescriptions; 2) not getting
specialist care; 3) skipping a recommended test or follow-up exam;
and 4) not visiting a doctor or clinic over a medical problem. Plans
should be required to reach out to consumers and make available
counseling to guide them if they are having any of the above
problems.
3. Collect Data and Analyze the Extent of Preventable
Hospitalizations, Correlate to Insurance Products and the
Extent to Which Care Was Not Accessed Due to Unused
Deductible
As discussed above, there already is a high correlation
between HDHPs and consumers who delay or forego necessary care
due to concerns about costs. Legislation could be passed requiring the
collection and analysis of data to help determine whether cost-related
access problems are emerging and causing preventable
hospitalizations. Data should determine whether there is a correlation
between preventable hospitalizations and the types of insurance
products with a specific focus on the impact of HDHPs.
B. Protecting Individual Consumers from the Financial Risks
Involved
1. Set Maximum Limits on the Deductibles
On the HDHPs offered with HSAs, states cannot interfere
with the federal minimums but can set maximums lower than the
federal levels." 8 On the HDHPs offered without HSAs, states should
set maximum levels. As opposed to federal law, most states have no
laws limiting the maximum amounts. The question is where to set the
maximums. Studies have shown that individuals with annual incomes
118 The federal maximums are $5000 for individuals and $10,000 for families.
26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A) (2005).
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below $50,000 are most vulnerable. 19 Legislation could require on-
going evaluation of the affordability of the deductibles based on
income level. However, for the time being, the maximums should be
set at a level that protects individuals below this income level.
In addition, federal legislation could require employers to
fund HSAs for individuals with incomes below $50,000. Similarly,
state law also could require employers that are not covered by ERISA
to fund HSAs for individuals with incomes below $50,000. Note,
however, that this protection is limited because HDHPs that are
marketed separate and apart from HSAs will impose deductibles with
no opportunity for tax-subsidized savings.
In order to protect individuals from financial peril, there is a
good argument that individuals below a certain income level should
be exempt from spending their deductibles on catastrophic care.
1 21
State law could add this exemption from the deductibles.
2. Set Requirements on the Expenses That Count Toward
the Deductibles
Legislation could clarify which out-of-pocket expenses
actually count toward the deductible. These should include any out-
of-pocket expenses incurred that could be covered by the insurance
plan, whether or not the consumer used a network provider in the
11 See Schoen, supra note 37, at W5-291-92 (defining the under-insured as
people with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level who spend more than
5% of their income on out-of-pocket medical costs and anyone else who spends
more than 10% of their income on out-of-pocket medical costs). This may be
considered as a benchmark for setting limits.
120 Federal law requires employers to fund HSAs equally for all employees,
thus prohibiting differential treatment even if it were done to protect lower-income
employees. See INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-2, supra note 9, at A-32. See
also Mark Hall, Paying for What You Get, and Getting What You Pay For: Legal
Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming publication) (discussing possibilities for promoting progressive
practices in insurance pricing).
121 In South Africa, for example, experiments with consumer-driven health
care have allowed for "riders" to exclude hospitalization, surgery, and chronic
conditions from the deductible, the idea being that first dollar coverage is necessary
to cover spending that truly is "non-discretionary." Monahan, supra note 7, at 25.
See also Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 43, at 33 (suggesting a "managed
competition" approach that allows only "small" co-payments and deductibles for
inpatient hospital services because patients have relatively little influence over
decisions about the use of such services).
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case of HMOs, or a preferred provider in the case of PPOs. 122 If
utilization review ("UR") procedures are to be used to limit which
expenses can count toward the deductibles, then they must be
available for prospective use by consumers who must have a clear
understanding and a prompt procedure to use to access the UR
process.
If the HDHP negotiates discounts with providers, then
legislation could require that the negotiated rates be used as a limit
only if the consumer is clearly informed before making payment, the
consumer has clear and accurate information about which providers
are in the network, and the preferred providers are prohibited from
collecting amounts that exceed the negotiated rates.
3. Set Limits on Out-Of-Pocket Maximums Which Take Into
Account the Deductibles and the Co-Payments and Cost-
Sharing.
As discussed above, the trend toward HDHPs is part of an on-
going trend to shift costs to consumers. Therefore, when looking at
issues of affordability, it is important to have a full view of
consumers' exposure to out-of-pocket costs. These include the
premiums as well as co-payments and cost-sharing beyond the out-
of-pocket costs incurred in order to meet the deductible. Legislation
could require that limits be set on the total out-of-pocket costs with a
particular emphasis on protecting the most financially vulnerable
consumers and the sickest. In addition, there are some states which
are concerned with "illusory benefits." In California, for example,
illusory benefits are defined as situations where the premiums paid
exceed a certain percentage of claims (a loss to claims ratio). 123 Such
a definition should include the payments made not only for the
premiums but for the deductibles and the other forms of cost-sharing.
C. Protecting Consumers from Undue "Risk Segmentation" and
Against Losing Comprehensive Health Insurance as a Choice
The most important way to protect against "risk
segmentation" is to set limits on insurers' opportunities to exclude
individuals. 124 Regulatory reforms which prohibit such exclusions
122 26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(B) (2005); INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2004-2,
supra note 9, at A-4.
123 Cal. Ins. Code § 10291.5(b)(2) (2005).
124 See Jacobi, supra note 51, at 379-8 1.
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force insurers into the position of spreading risks among their
insurance products. 125 The goal should be to retain access to
comprehensive health care coverage as a viable option. 126 In order to
prevent a cycle where comprehensive health insurance becomes
utilized only by the sickest individuals and thus becomes
unaffordable (called "adverse selection"), legislation can require
insurers to absorb these risks by requiring them to' offer "low-
deductible" health insurance products, 2  even if' they offer
HDHPs. 128 Therefore, legislation should: a) require insurers to
provide employers a choice of a non-HDHP with HDHPs; b) require
employers to offer employees a choice of a non-HDHP with HDHPs;
and c) require insurers marketing in the individual market to offer a
choice of non-HDHP with HDHP. These products should be required
to keep the difference in premiums within a manageable range so that
insurers will have an incentive to spread risks broadly within and
amongst products. In addition, on a related front, legislation should
require HDHPs to offer comprehensive health care, i.e., stop allowing
HDHPs to limit access to basic health care services such as maternity
care, doctor's visits, or hospital care that is medically necessary.
As discussed above, states need to be concerned about the
negative impact HDHPs that are not required to offer comprehensive
health care will have on COBRA and HIPAA protections.
Specifically, individuals with differentials in coverage or deductibles
will not have the same "creditable coverage" to prevent pre-existing
condition exclusions. The federal government or the states could
protect such individuals by: a) creating a "HIPAA"-like portability
protection for anyone moving from an HDHP to a comprehensive
health insurance product; and b) requiring a "HIPAA"-like portability
protection which prohibits exclusions based on differentials in
125 Id. at 375-79.
126 See Relman, supra note 56, at 28 (noting insurance is rife with the potential
for "market failures" where due to competition among insurers, individuals lose
access to the market and the market, left to unfettered competition, has the potential
to "dilute" the products available); Davis, supra note 54, at 1227 (noting that
without risk adjustment, sicker and lower-income individuals will pay higher
premiums, and HMOs may eventually cease to exist as unfavorable risk selection
worsens).
127 These could be defined as insurance products with deductibles below the
minimum allowed by law to meet the definition of an HDHP.
128 See Jost & Hall, supra note 8, at 412-13 (discussing possible ways that
both employers and insurers can spread risks across products and the potential role
of regulation in ensuring that takes place).
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deductible amounts. Note that under federal law, states are permitted
to be more protective of consumers than the federal law (a "reverse"
pre-emption clause).129
VI. Conclusion
HDHPs offer nothing more than a temporary band-aid, at
best, and at worst, a misguided and unfortunate burden on consumers
in the name of curbing the amounts of money spent on health care
without tackling cost-containment in a meaningful way. We are only
forestalling the inevitable, which is a more meaningful dialogue
about the role of insurers in spreading risks and the role of policy-
makers in controlling costs. My personal preference would be not to
allow these products at all. However, short of a prohibition there
must be protections.
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-23 (1996).
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